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Arbitrum Delegation Statement
Decentralization
Working Groups
Name Jana Bertram
Wallet Address or ENS janabe.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to?
- NFT development on Arbitrum
- Improving Governance participation
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO: eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
Governing Arbitrum means 1. allocating resources to promote ecosystem growth and 2. contributing to the technical product. When assessing investments, we need to look beyond the initial growth and have strategies & programs for retaining projects and users.
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:
Sample Voting Issue 1: Issue Overview 1.3k
- Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
- For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
- This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
Prompts to Answer:
- How would you vote? Against
- What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I would remove Flipside from the Oversight Committee. The Oversight committee needs to be independent from the executor / the allocation committee. By having Flipside on both committee with almost 50% of votes, there's no real checks and balances against abuse of power and the whole program is de facto centralized.
- How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? Per above, it's about checks and balances. If one entity allocates/executes, that's ok, it helps get things done. It just can't be that the same entity is doing oversight.
Sample Voting Issue 2: Issue Overview: Overview Link 1 3.7k Overview Link 2 502
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
- Split Reimbursement I'm assuming the hack is substantial and full reimbursement would be more than 25% of the DAO treasury. Then the reimbursement should be partial. A reimbursement is important as it signal user protection and the community assuming responsibility for the product they govern. If the community gets the upsides, e.g. protocol revenue, it also needs to work on improving the product, including security. Hacks indicate a vulnerability which should be the responsibility of those who profit from the protocol.
Languages I speak and write: English, Italian, Czech
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: currently head of strategy at RARI Foundation & zkSync delegate
| Proposal | Votes for | Votes against | Voted? |
|---|---|---|---|
Executed Jun 8th, 2026 | 206.39M | 8.67M | No vote |
Executed May 11th, 2026 | 193.12M | 4.05K | No vote |
Executed Apr 20th, 2026 | 193.92M | 266.93K | No vote |
Executed Feb 23rd, 2026 | 247.89M | 362.6K | No vote |
Executed Dec 1st, 2025 | 263.67M | 16K | No vote |
| Proposal | Ballot |
|---|---|
No vote | |
No vote | |
No vote | |
No vote | |
No vote |
