Castle Labs

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Delegating 203.5 ARB to:

User profile image
Castle Labs

Delegating 203.5 ARB to:

Castle Labs is a research collective deeply rooted in the on-chain world, offering a unique perspective that aligns with the needs and dynamics of market participants and DeFi power users.

Our collective is a blend of on-chain natives – researchers, analysts, builders, and traders – who are not just participants but active contributors to the crypto ecosystem. This diversity ensures a comprehensive understanding of the market, from technical intricacies to user behaviors. Our USP lies in our deep integration with crypto communities. We don't just observe; we engage, interact, and evolve with the market.

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Arbitrum Delegation Statement

Name (organization or individual): Castle Capital (organisation)

Wallet Address or ENS: castlecapital.eth (arb)

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x5162728cc4d7d111400056925a1b3df82308bee0

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO: eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO

  1. Supporting technical upgrades to the ecosystem
  2. Incentivising reach, retention, and revenue of protocols within the ecosystem
  3. Incentivising the building of tools, and educational resources for the ecosystem
  4. Guiding decentralisation of the ecosystemLiquidity mining should be kept to the bare minimum wherever possible to dissuade mercenary capital farming DAO tokens. Token emissions themselves should have positive effects much further than incentivising TVL on-chain, for instance by being directed primarily to grants for the building of tools and resources for the ecosystem. When token emissions are to be used for incentivising protocol usage, a framework should be created to ensure distributors of these emissions are building sustainable models around their own products to incentivise their reach (new users). The product offering itself should be capable of retaining that captured reach (user base) and generating its own revenue, allowing it to grow and prosper sustainably without relying on further emissions.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1: Issue Overview

  1. How would you vote?

Against

  1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
  • Separate the proposal into a solely Community-Analytics focused scenario and away from treasury/capital management (singular-focused proposals should be the standard);
  • Segment grant amounts into shorter time periods with set measurable objectives based on the Reach and Retention of the outputs;
  • One way to improve transparency, accountability, and alignment of goals would be the establishment of a public, crowd-sourced task board. Although undoubtedly imperfect initially, the distribution process can be iteratively improved over time.For example:1. Starting by requesting small tasks from multiple third parties to find those that are the best fit
  1. Increasing size and discretionary freedom of use of funds after successful cases
  2. Using a KPI-based distribution system to increase accountability, trust and promote an over-delivery cultureCrowdsourcing and assigning appropriate reward amounts for tasks which are aligned with the UNI objectives sourced from the community would be a great long term goal
  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between the centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

We believe in centralisation until product-market fit is found, as long as the best authority is leading —for this example, I cannot comment on whether Uniswap properly explored all Analytics options in their selection of Flipside. This could also be achieved in a distributed way where multiple providers were given the initial opportunity and grants were accelerated based on expertise and competent outputs as time progressed.

Voting Issue 2 (Rari hack reimbursement)

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation? i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement* This is mainly on a case-by-case basis, but when the protocol has a large enough treasury to facilitate such a reimbursement, it should definitely be explored. However, a DAO must also ensure it can continue to operate after such a reimbursement. Other mechanisms such as escrowed or vested reimbursements can also be explored to limit damage to the DAO (these mechanisms work only as long as the DAO generates revenue).

  • Another route would be a debt token which can be freely traded on the market, where the team buys it back. This is a very transparent and market-oriented way to solve debt obligations.
  • Exploits are a huge issue for the industry and how DAOs react to them will imprint their reputation for years to come. Nonetheless, it should also be considered that multiple insurance avenues are available, and all users of smart contracts must consider the risks in the first place.

Languages we speak and write:

English, French, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, German, and Korean

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

There are no conflicts of interest that would prevent us from using our best judgments. All interests align fully with the Arbitrum ecosystem — any member working in the space is working within the Arbitrum ecosystem itself.


ProposalVotes forVotes againstVoted?

206.39M

8.67M

No vote

193.12M

4.05K

No vote

193.92M

266.93K

No vote

247.89M

362.6K

No vote

263.67M

16K

For