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Arbitrum Delegation Statement
Decentralization
Public Goods
Treasury Management
Name (organization or individual): Zeptimus
Wallet Address or ENS: zeptimus.eth
Telegram/X: @zeptimusq
Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/zeptimus.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to?
- DeFi development on Arbitrum
- Gaming development on Arbitrum
- Improving Governance participation
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I want Arbitrum DAO to be a place where the market dictates where to innovate keeping the strong focus on DeFi it already have. Coming from competitive gaming (played Heroes before Blizzard killed it), I know what happens when centralized power gets in the way.
My focus is on DeFi, gaming and governance - building systems where value flows back to arb token, that's the only way i know any community can thrive long term.
I am excited about AI agents for governance to create unbiased frameworks that guide us to coordinate efforts and get the best results possible.
I want to see Arbitrum lead in both DeFi and gaming, but with true market dynamics getting back to ARB.
Languages I speak and write:
- English
- Spanish
- Catalan
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflicts of interest in being an Arbitrum delegate and act on what I believe is the best for this community.
I’m working at General Magic, and have a close relationship with Giveth galaxy since 2019. Any potential vote regarding those organizations I will abstain.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
For
I would vote for, they have a strong centralization power and at the same time they are being a key actor. For me what’s important it’s to have mechanisms to take them down at any time if the community believes they are not doing a good job. Add a community-driven mechanism to revoke Flipside's privileges if they underperform—their seats should be subject to performance reviews based on clear metrics, and if they fail, the community can vote to redistribute those seats.
Some centralization is fine for execution, but power should always be revocable. Let Flipside have their shot at running this efficiently, but keep them accountable through clear performance metrics and community oversight.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Vote: Split Reimbursement
This is a tricky one, as we need to decide between accountability and keeping the trust of the community. The protocol messed up and it led to this exploit, they should own some of the responsibility. But it’s also not fair to put all of that weight on TRIBE holders. At the same time, users who take on risky positions knowingly have to take some of the responsibility themselves. After all, DeFi involves risks and, and we can’t make a habit of bailing people out.
It was the least voted but I'm in favor of partial reimbursement —like options 1 or 2—feels like a reasonable compromise. It helps those affected without completely offloading the loss. Going forward, I’d also push for clearer risk frameworks in future proposals. If the DAO is going to commit to reimbursements, it should be something defined upfront, not a decision made in the heat of the moment. That way, we avoid creating moral hazards down the line and the market knows what are the processes they are buying on.
| Proposal | Votes for | Votes against | Voted? |
|---|---|---|---|
Executed Jun 8th, 2026 | 206.39M | 8.67M | For |
Executed May 11th, 2026 | 193.12M | 4.05K | For |
Executed Apr 20th, 2026 | 193.92M | 266.93K | For |
Executed Feb 23rd, 2026 | 247.89M | 362.6K | For |
Executed Dec 1st, 2025 | 263.67M | 16K | For |
| Proposal | Ballot |
|---|---|
For | |
For | |
For | |
For | |
For |
