Name - George Beall (Individual)
ENS - hiringdevs.eth
Tally - Tally | hiringdevs.eth
Areas - DeFi development; tooling, improving protocol decentralization

Personal Background - former Head of Business and Operations for Commonwealth (DAO governance platform for dYdX, Osmosis, 1inch, Terra, Axie, and more. Previously the founder of Everipedia, decentralized knowledge platform (raised $30M from Galaxy). Active contributor in dYdX governance ecosystem.

Goals for Arbitrum DAO

1. Facilitating the development of a complete and robust dapp ecosystem

• DeFi - Lending, Swaps/Stableswaps, Derivatives/Options, Stablecoin, RWAs
• NFTs - Marketplaces, Minting, Community Engagement Tools
• DAOs - Delegate Community, Voting Interfaces, Reputation Scoring
• Infra - Wallets, Bridges, Analytics, Tax Tooling

2. Making sustainable investments in ecosystem growth

• While defi yields are low there is an opportunity to be the highest paying pool at a sustainable rate. Yields on stables are less than T-bills This cost-benefit should look to balance: total expense, net increase in TVL and volume, net increase in active wallets, fees generated.
• We should have a preference for smalls grants tied to dev labor for explicit creation of open source software and equity investments in projects. The Ethereum Foundation has done a great job of maximizing their budget by not investing in grants or equity too heavily and thereby making it the job of the founders to get VC funding. This amplifies the resources of the ecosystem and ensures we make calculated bets on OSS and promising equities in the ecosystem.

3. Provide LP capital for early projects

• LP capital is becoming harder to come by and thereby it is harder to bootstrap new defi projects or new deployments in other ecosystems. We can help attract builders by bootstrapping their LP base with the implication that they must pass audits, be building a net new product for us, and are committed to the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Voting Issue #1
Against
I think the fact the community tapped into a new issue at the 11th hour means the topic should be discussed more heavily before being sent to a vote. I would amend the proposal to allocate 2 seats to Flipside on the allocation committee and give 1 seat to a representative selected by the community (likely from one of the other analytics providers, but not necessarily). I would also ensure that the multisig requires at least 2 non-Flipside signatures in order to execute.
I think it’s incredible important to help DAO operators get things done and do their jobs. I am a big believer in the sub-DAO model where the DAO has a thorough discussion about parameters for a project led by a task force. It’s also important to reduce governance fatigue to keep voter turnout high, so minimizing voting decisions and empowering operators is the best path forward.

Voting Issue #2

1. Full reimbursement
   The biggest issue around the reimbursement was actually prior with the merge. Fei did a big merger and supposed to be building a big ecosystem, but spent a lot of money for most of the Rari core team to quit immediately. Thereby they spent a lot of money for open source code that they now are committing to keep-up and support. This left a bad taste in Fei’s mouth regarding Rari. This + not wanting to endanger the main Fei product/community during a market downturn led them to want to reneg on their commitments. Generally speaking, based on all of the levels of commitment Fei gave to supporting Rari holders, they needed to follow through with their commitment.

That being said, in a broader hack/refund circumstance, I believe it is the project’s responsibility to mitigate all possible risks via audits, insurance, bug bounties, etc., but that pending malfeasance, negligence, or previous commitments the team cannot be held responsible.

Languages - English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest - I serve as the enforcer for dYdX Ops Trust helping build sub-DAO tooling for the dYdX community.