Name: Goverland

Wallet Address or ENS: goverland.eth

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0xb5dba35092ad57c02219b2e0abf60d67c7d2f71e

Area of interest:

• Public Goods funding
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on the overall goals for the DAO:

Attract top talent (builders, influencers, researchers, etc.) by setting an example of being at the forefront of Web3 innovation.

Our decision-making prioritizes mid- and long-term outcomes with a strategic focus, and we provide comments on our votes, explaining our rationale.

We conduct daily research to find the best examples of governance and develop tools for the next generation of DAOs. Our goal is to make decentralization easy, convenient, approachable, and transparent. We are committed to fostering a healthy, collaborative and innovative DAO ecosystem. Our team includes not only developers and crypto enthusiasts, but also individuals with strong soft skills and a deep understanding of community growth.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Uniswap/Flipside

We would vote against the proposal.

The proposal has several interesting points. It aims to run a program for two years with 15 million UNI allocated in the first year. Flipside would split this allocation to earn yield (estimating around 30% APY), using 50% of the earnings to fund its operations and 50% to finance new user acquisition. However, this proposal raises several concerns:

• Proposed reward is significantly higher than industry standards: The proposed reward structure offers returns that are at least double what professional treasury management companies typically charge, which is around 0.5% management fee on assets under management and a 10% performance fee. This discrepancy raises questions about the fairness and competitiveness of the proposed terms.
• Combining treasury yield generation and user acquisition bounties: The proposal combines two distinct activities — treasury yield generation and financing new user acquisition bounties. These activities require completely different skill sets, and merging them into a single proposal may lead to inefficiencies and conflicts of interest.
• Excessive control by Flipside: Granting Flipside 3 out of 7 seats on the allocation committee and 1 out of 3 seats on the oversight committee centralizes too much power in the hands of a single service provider. This level of control could undermine the decentralization principles of the DAO and favor one service provider disproportionately.

Suggested Amendments:

1. Separate Treasury Management and User Acquisition:
   • Create distinct proposals for treasury management and user acquisition to ensure each area is handled by specialists, enhancing efficiency and effectiveness.
2. Implement a Tender-Based Approach:
   • Introduce a competitive tender process, allowing multiple service providers to present their plans. This ensures a fair selection process based on merit and value.
3. Adopt High-Level Principles:
   1. Inclusive Selection Process:
      • Open the selection process to the Web3 market, inviting all professional treasury management service providers to present detailed plans. Encourage open dialogue between providers and the community, testing small funds with different projects for better insights.
   2. Separation of Powers:
      • Ensure those deciding on funding are not the same as those implementing the work. Hold open votes for committee positions before allocating funds, ensuring only third-party individuals or entities without conflicts of interest are elected.
   3. Decentralized Decision-Making:
      • Embrace decentralized decision-making to foster resilience. Following Nassim Taleb’s "antifragility" concept, systems should thrive on stress and variability. Avoid centralizing fund control to ensure long-term sustainability.

These amendments aim to balance efficiency with decentralization and fairness, ensuring transparent, inclusive, and resilient DAO operations.

Sample Voting Issue 2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

Our choice: Full Reimbursement

As delegates of the Rari Capital community, we would be committed to acting in the best interest of token holders. The primary victims of the hack were the users of the protocol. Failing to reimburse them when the protocol has the means to do so would result in a complete loss of trust in the team and cause devastating damage to the remaining token holders, likely leading to a halt of the protocol. In our opinion, reimbursement in this case is the only viable option to consider.

Languages we speak and write:

English, German, Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

While we may act as delegates, governance participants, and consultants in other L2 protocols, we commit to always acting in the best interest of the Arbitrum community.