Name: Daniela | danimim.eth

Wallet address: danimim.eth (0x3b9F47629cD4D5903cF3eB897aaC4F6b41Dd2589)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | danimim.eth

Twitter profile: https://twitter.com/danimimm

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• Public Goods funding
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

As a product manager at blockful, I’m currently focused on on-chain reputation, and building Trustful (RFP1 of the Cartographers Syndicate x ThankARB). I have been a member of the Arbitrum DAO since day one, with an active forum account. My team at blockful played a key role in scaling ENS on Arbitrum and has contributed to significant works like the ENS Security Council. With a deep understanding of the DAO ecosystem, valuable insights, and a dedicated team by my side, I am committed to being even more active within the Arbitrum ecosystem. I have participated in most events and discussions, and I look forward to continuing to contribute long-term value to Arbitrum’s governance as a delegate.

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The DAO should serve as the point of contact for funds and ecosystem growth, while also ensuring secure and beneficial enhancements and updates across the entire Arbitrum ecosystem. Funds should be allocated to incentivize the development of unique products and ideas within the ecosystem. A DAO responsible for advancing Arbitrum must also remain vigilant and collaborate closely with Ethereum to maintain alignment with the core vision of the Ethereum ecosystem. Therefore, the DAO should prioritize: 1) maintaining decentralized, secure, and effective governance to ensure economic sustainability; 2) continuing to stimulate Arbitrum's growth by incentivizing builders and protocols that strengthen the Arbitrum ecosystem and value; 3) staying aligned with Ethereum's core principles as an L2 solution that provides benefits to the decentralized ecosystem as a whole.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

• How would you vote? Against
• What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? Alter the allocation committee to 1/7 instead of 3/7 as proposed by Flipside. I would simply vote against it and outline my reasoning. There are countless alternative methods to increase user engagement.
• How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? I see a problem with this proposal because, although committees or delegates fulfill the vital function of representing the voices of many in order to optimize governance processes, a DAO shouldn't put governance or decentralization at risk in exchange for more users. We can explore other avenues to achieve this. While users are a crucial part, governance encompasses the entirety, and when governance is jeopardized, the treasury is at stake, which could be irreversible. The involvement of only one service provider in this also indicates a selective decision-making process. Other service providers may wonder why they were not included in these seats with the same impact, undermining the credibility with those who are investing effort, time, and work into the DAO. This kind of movement, granting seats to university clubs, sounds like a bribery system, where someone votes in a particular interest and receives something in return. Cancelling this proposal would prevent community problems and discussions and would not bring the centralization/decentralization problem into question. The slight discrepancy also suggests a political agenda rather than a community-driven one. Would the voting result be the same if Uniswap implemented a private voting system?

Sample Voting Issue 2:

The full reimbursement in this case will almost always be assured, as the major voters can also be the involved parts, primarily due to their potentially greater voting power. The DAO's objective should be to foster consensus among all parties involved. It's worth noting that this differs from the previous scenario, where there wasn't an almost bribery-like system at play; here, those directly affected are voting, rather than a political outsourcing based on seat gains.

Failure to reimburse in this case could result in a loss of reputation within the ecosystem and potentially lead to a protocol crash, especially worse following a hack.

In my opinion, it's preferable to reimburse and begin developing alternative economic mechanisms to safeguard this value as soon as possible, or to implement a reimbursement system that occurs gradually over time to mitigate any impact on token price.

The hacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability within Rari's Fuse lending protocol. Nevertheless, it's crucial to recognize the complexity of this situation. From my perspective, there isn't a definitive right or wrong answer, given the multitude of interests at stake.

Languages I speak and write:

Portuguese, English, Spanish, Russian and French

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am a Chainlink community advocate, but I vote, speak and take decisions based on my perspective, which aligns with my team’s perspective at blockful, whom I am representing here. My team’s technical knowledge and market vision also reflect my own views. This means I am bringging with me the valuable background of my team in most decisions. I will remain impartial whenever my team is actively involved with any proposal.